Tungsten is receiving renewed attention from policymakers and defence officials in Washington, Brussels, and other capitals across Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.
The intermediate product ammonium paratungstate (APT) prices as of April 2026 are up over 800% since 2024, China imposed export controls on tungsten products in February 2025, and the metal’s role in key defence components has placed the tungsten supply chain at the center of Western efforts to diversify supply chains amid rising defence spending.
Today, China accounts for approximately 80% of global mined tungsten output. But this level of supply concentration is a relatively recent development, in the context of its production throughout the 20th century. The United States was once a leading producer, with domestic output supported by direct government intervention through periods of conflict and rising defence demand. US and allied mines remained competitive into the 1980s before Chinese production reshaped the global market.
The shift from a diversified supply with the United States at its center to one dominated by a single producer offers a useful case study in how strategic supply chains can be lost and what governments did the last time tungsten supply became a strategic problem. The successes and mistakes of the past century carry direct lessons for the policy choices facing the United States and its allies today.
Why Tungsten Matters
Tungsten is an enabling material: it is embedded in the tools and components that manufacture finished products, and in many cases appears directly in end products themselves. Demand for tungsten therefore tracks general industrial and manufacturing output closely, making the tungsten supply chain strategically important across multiple sectors.
The largest end-use application is tungsten carbide, accounting for around 56% of global tungsten consumption. Tungsten carbide is used in drill bits for oil and gas extraction, milling inserts for machining automotive and aerospace components, mining equipment, and metal-forming dies.
The second major use is tungsten alloys for industrial and defence applications. Tungsten is combined with other metals to enhance properties including density, hardness, wear resistance, and high-temperature strength. It is used in nickel superalloys for jet engine turbine blades and industrial gas turbines, where structural integrity must be maintained at extreme temperatures.
The defence sector is a significant user of tungsten. Its high density makes it critical for kinetic energy penetrators used in armour-piercing rounds. It is also used in fragmentation munitions, ballast weights in precision-guided systems, counterweights in rotary-wing aircraft, and inertial navigation components. Defence related demand will increase as the United States Europe, and Japan promise to increase defence spending, and governments in the Middle East will need to replenish supplies following the ongoing conflict.
The remaining demand categories are tungsten steel (16%) and tungsten chemicals (4%), including tungsten hexafluoride (WF₆), a process gas required in semiconductor fabrication. Demand from this sector is growing as semiconductor production scales.
From Mine to End Use: The Tungsten Value Chain
The tungsten supply chain runs from mining through intermediate processing to final applications. As shown in Figure 2, tungsten moves from ore extraction through to intermediates such as ammonium paratungstate (APT), into powders, carbides, and alloys, before reaching end-use sectors such as industrial tooling, energy, and defence.
Recycling also plays a significant role, accounting for an estimated 25–35% of global supply. Recycling rates are higher outside of China (30–50%), making secondary supply a critical buffer against primary mining concentration.
A Century as a Strategic Mineral – World War I to Present
China’s introduction of export controls in 2025 elevated the status of tungsten as a critical mineral, especially at a time of increased defence spending. However, tungsten has been a strategic mineral for over a century. The United States and allies have repeatedly been forced to intervene to secure supply during wartime and periods of strategic competition. Both World Wars and the Korean War prompted US and allied governments to deploy policy measures including direct procurement, price support, and preemptive purchasing. Examining these episodes alongside China’s gradual capture of the market since the 1980s shows how strategic supply chains, including the tungsten supply chain, are built and lost, and what governments have historically done to defend them.
World War I
Tungsten emerged as a critical mineral during World War I, used to strengthen steel and produce cutting tools. Although tungsten ore came partly from England, processing was centered in Germany and Austria, and the use of tungsten cutting tools and tungsten steel is widely credited with giving Germany a production advantage over the Allies in the early years of the war.
Tungsten-hardened tools allowed German industry to machine weapons faster and with greater precision, increasing output at a time when industrial capacity was a decisive factor in warfare. The material was also used in high-speed steel, enabling tools to operate at higher temperatures without losing strength, a key innovation in mass production during the war.
As shown in Figure 5, global production grew steadily throughout the war to meet defence demand. The United States became a leading global producer, supplying its own military as well as those of its allies. The chart also foreshadows the current supply landscape: even at this early stage, China was establishing itself as a significant force in ore production and the broader tungsten supply chain.
By World War II, advances in tungsten carbide technology, especially in Germany, had dramatically expanded its military applications. Germany was reportedly the first military to use tungsten carbides for armour piercing rounds that “melted” British tanks in North Africa, and it utilized tungsten carbide cutting tools for military related production (Source: International Tungsten Industry Association, Tungsten).
Similar to today, the tungsten supply chain played a central role in economic statecraft and export restrictions during the Wolfram Crisis. Spain was a key supplier of tungsten to Germany alongside Portugal, given Germany’s inability to access Asian supply.
The United States and United Kingdom initially sought to limit German access through preemptive purchasing, which drove tungsten revenues to account for roughly 1% of Spain’s gross national product. German purchases, meanwhile, secured the cancellation of Spanish Civil War debt. The United States subsequently imposed an oil embargo on Spain to further restrict tungsten exports to Germany, and in May 1944 the U.S., U.K., and Spain signed a formal agreement capping exports to Germany.
The Wolfram Crisis is the clearest 20th -century example of tungsten as a tool of economic statecraft. The US and UK used preemptive purchasing, embargoes, and export restrictions to deny supply to an adversary, mirroring the playbook China is using today through export licensing.
Korean War
The outbreak of the Korean War triggered another sharp rise in tungsten prices, driven by U.S. government policy and a concern that closely mirrors today’s: the risk of being cut off from Chinese supply following Mao Zedong’s victory in the Chinese Civil War.
The U.S. government responded with the Domestic Tungsten Purchase Program to increase domestic production. In 1951, the government committed to purchase tungsten concentrate at $63 per ton until 3 million tons were delivered on July 1, 1956. Government purchasing led to record domestic production, with most of the material directed to the National Strategic Stockpile. Existing mines operated at full capacity, but companies limited longer-term capital investment due to market uncertainty after the program’s expiration (Source: Minerals Yearbook: Metals and minerals (except fuels) 1955 Year 1955, Volume I 1958).
The program drove U.S. production to record levels, strengthening the domestic tungsten supply chain with output concentrated in Nevada and California.
The purchasing program extended beyond U.S. borders. As the war intensified, the Department of Interior sent experts to South Korea to support the development of the Sangdong mine.
In 1952, the U.S. agreed to purchase all tungsten produced in South Korea at $65 per ton for two years (Source: Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2). Reports indicate that US government purchases accounted for the entirety of South Korea’s tungsten production in 1953 and nearly 75% of its total exports that year, making South Korea the third-largest tungsten producer globally (Source: Jaeyoung Ha, Mineral for Empire: U.S. Mining of South Korean Tungsten, 1945–1954, Diplomatic History, Volume 48, Issue 5, November 2024, Pages 690–718). More than seventy years after the U.S. government helped develop Sangdong, the mine began production again in late 2025 under Almonty Industries. It will assist in supplying Western defense supply chains once again confronting Chinese supply disruption.
1980s to Present: China Dominates the Tungsten Supply Chain
Since China’s economic opening in the 1980s, its low-cost producers have captured global tungsten market share, driving down prices and accelerating the closure of operations in higher cost jurisdictions. Beijing reinforced this position through a series of export restrictions on primary materials — first banning concentrate exports to capture value-added processing domestically, then imposing quotas on APT. As shown in Figure 11, Chinese output increased steadily throughout the decade, while U.S. production declined to near zero. The trajectory reflected a structural shift rather than a cyclical downturn: once prices fell below the cost curve for Western producers, capacity was permanently removed from the market rather than temporarily idled.
What made this shift decisive was not simply lower costs but the combination of scale, policy support, and pricing power. As Chinese production expanded rapidly, global tungsten prices declined to levels that were uneconomic for higher-cost producers in the United States and elsewhere. Unlike market-driven competitors, Chinese producers operated within a system where production levels, exports, and pricing could be influenced by state policy. Supply remained high even during periods of weak pricing, effectively pushing prices below the cost curve for Western producers.
Crucially, this dynamic created a feedback loop. As Western mines closed, global supply became more concentrated in China, further increasing its ability to influence prices. With fewer alternative sources of supply, non-Chinese producers lost the ability to respond to price signals, reinforcing China’s position as the marginal supplier.
Chinese producers have entrenched their position further through vertical integration. As illustrated in Figure 12, major Chinese firms span mining, intermediates (APT), refining, and end-use tooling, whereas Western players are fragmented across individual stages.
This integration allows Chinese companies to absorb low ore prices internally in ways that standalone Western mining companies cannot. Losses at the mining stage can be offset by margins further downstream, enabling continued production even in low-price environments. In contrast, Western producers, often focused on a single stage of the value chain, are directly exposed to price declines and are forced to curtail production or shut down entirely.
The combination of sustained low pricing, policy-driven export controls, and vertical integration ultimately led to the erosion of Western supply, transforming what began as a cost advantage into structural control over the global tungsten supply chain. Non-Chinese miners are structurally exposed to price cycles driven by Chinese output decisions, leaving them unable to compete during prolonged periods of low pricing. The result is a market in which the dominant supplier also sets the price floor.
This historical shift highlights a key lesson for current policy: once supply chains are lost due to prolonged periods of uneconomic pricing, they are difficult to rebuild. Preventing a repeat requires not only new production but also coordinated support across the value chain to avoid the same structural vulnerabilities that led to the collapse of Western tungsten supply.
The Tungsten Supply Chain Today: Concentration and Pricing
The historical patterns described above have led to today’s highly concentrated supply structure. China dominates upstream production, recent export controls have driven prices sharply higher, and the United States finds itself import-dependent across the supply chain.
Market Concentration
China accounts for around 80% of global mined tungsten output. Production is heavily concentrated in Jiangxi Province in southeastern China, one of the world’s most important tungsten regions. Beijing has imposed production quotas and export licensing controls since the 1990s. The policy regime has tightened over successive decades and serves both to manage resource depletion and to give Beijing a mechanism to influence global supply.
In February 2025, China imposed export controls on tungsten as part of a broader package covering several critical minerals. Exporters are now required to obtain government licenses from the Ministry of Commerce and the General Administration of Customs for certain tungsten products. Licenses are required for intermediates such as APT and tungsten carbide, and companies must provide information about the end-use purchaser to ship material abroad. The restrictions are part of China’s effort to limit exports of dual-use materials and make it highly unlikely that defense-related companies will receive Chinese shipments. Unlike other critical minerals, declining domestic ore grades and domestic consumption give Beijing a further incentive to tighten export controls.
Outside of China, Vietnam (approximately 3.5% of global production) and Kazakhstan (3% of global production), were the two leading producers in 2025 (Source: USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026). Vietnamese production is concentrated at the Nui Phao mine operated by Masan High-Tech Materials. Current production in Kazakhstan is largely inaccessible for Western military applications: the Bakuta mine, in the country’s east near the Chinese border, is operated by Jiaxin International Resources, a Chinese company. Historically, Russia has also been a secondary tungsten producer. However, following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, sanctions and trade dislocations significantly reduced the availability of Russian tungsten to Western markets. North Korea is also among the top five producers of tungsten globally. In aggregate, China, Russia, Kazakhstan (Chinese-operated), and North Korea account for up to 90% of global mined tungsten output, meaning the US and its partners are structurally dependent on a supply base they cannot rely on in a conflict scenario.
Europe maintains limited primary tungsten production, notably from the Mittersill mine in Austria, the Barruecopardo mine in Spain and the Panasqueira mine in Portugal. Additional non-Chinese linked tungsten producers include Australia, Bolivia, and Rwanda. The United States has no active tungsten mine and has not produced domestically since 2015.
The forward supply outlook suggests a gradual shift in market structure driven by new project development outside of China. As shown in Figure 14, several new Western mining projects are expected to come online over the coming decade, modestly increasing non-Chinese supply and reducing China’s share of global mine output even as absolute Chinese production remains relatively stable.
However, the pace and scale of this shift remain uncertain. Many of these projects are not yet fully financed or operational, and delays or cost overruns could limit their impact. As a result, while future supply growth offers a pathway to diversification, the market is likely to remain heavily reliant on Chinese production in the near to medium term.
The picture is more balanced further downstream in the value chain. Unlike other critical minerals, the United States and its partners retain midstream processing capabilities. Austria, Japan, the United States, and Vietnam all have tungsten processing facilities capable of meeting Western demand.
Quick Snapshot – U.S. Supply Chain
Without domestic mined tungsten production, the United States predominantly sources ore and concentrate from Bolivia, Portugal, and Spain, and tungstate intermediates including APT from Vietnam, Austria, and Germany.
Further downstream, the US has decreased its dependency on China for tungsten metal powder and tungsten carbide. It now relies predominantly on Austria, Canada, Israel, and South Korea.
Current Price Environment
Tungsten APT prices remain elevated in 2026 and currently sit at around $3,000/mtu at the end of April 2026. Increased prices have been driven by Chinese policy measures – export restrictions and mining quotas. Export restrictions in 2025 initially elevated global prices due to uncertainty over the export regime. The license requirements and documentation process have slowed trade coming out of China. Limited domestic mining quotas tightened the market and elevated prices. Domestic production quotas are allocated by region and have been reduced for three consecutive years, with the 2025 allocation 6% below 2024. The quotas have not been announced for 2026.
As shown in Figure 18, tungsten prices were relatively stable for over a decade, largely trading within a narrow band between 2012 and 2022. This stability reflected China’s ability to manage supply and maintain price discipline through its quota system and dominant production base. However, beginning in 2024 and accelerating into 2025–2026, prices moved sharply higher. The step-change in pricing corresponds directly with the introduction of export controls and the tightening of domestic mining quotas, highlighting how sensitive the tungsten supply chain is to policy-driven supply constraints.
The recent increase in APT prices underscores the structural nature of the shift. Unlike previous short-term spikes driven by cyclical demand, the current move reflects a tightening of available supply at the source. Export licensing has reduced the flow of material into global markets, while lower quotas have constrained upstream production, limiting the market’s ability to respond.
The regional quota breakdown further illustrates this dynamic. As shown in Figure 19, production remains highly concentrated in a small number of provinces, particularly Jiangxi, Hunan, and Henan. While total quotas have declined year-over-year, the distribution across regions has remained relatively consistent, reinforcing that China’s supply base is both geographically concentrated and centrally managed. This structure allows policymakers to influence not just total supply, but also how quickly material reaches the market.
A Familiar but Increasingly Urgent Dynamic
The tungsten market today reflects patterns seen repeatedly over the past century: supply concentration, geopolitical tension, and government intervention during periods of conflict.
What is different now is the degree of concentration. China’s dominance across mining, processing, and manufacturing leaves the United States and its allies structurally dependent on a tungsten supply chain that may not be reliable in a conflict scenario.
With global instability rising and defence demand increasing, the need to diversify tungsten supply is becoming more urgent. The policy responses now emerging mirror those seen during previous wartime periods, suggesting that history is not just a backdrop, but a guide to what comes next.
The lesson of the past century is straightforward: when the United States and its allies treated tungsten as a strategic priority, they secured supply. When they let other governments dictate the market, they lost it.
A deeper look at how governments and industry are responding to this challenge, and what it means for future supply chains, will be explored in Part 2 of this article.
